By: Wayne Streibich, Diana M. Eng, Jonathan M. Robbin, and Andrea M. Roberts
On August 29, 2018, New York’s Appellate Division, Second Department, issued two decisions holding that documents submitted by a borrower in connection with an attempted short sale of the property did not constitute an acknowledgment of debt under New York General Obligations Law § 17-101 (“GOL § 17-101”). In Karpa Realty Group, LLC v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 2018 WL 4101011 (2d Dept. Aug. 29, 2018), the Second Department affirmed the Kings County Court’s decision granting plaintiff Karpa Realty Group, LLC’s motion for summary judgment and denying defendant Deutsche Bank National Trust Company’s cross-motion for summary judgment to dismiss Karpa Realty’s quiet title complaint. Deutsche Bank argued that the statute of limitations to foreclose had not expired because the borrower submitted a written hardship letter in connection with his short sale application, acknowledging the debt under GOL § 17-101, thus renewing the statute of limitations. The Second Department held the letter “did not constitute an unqualified acknowledgment of the debt or manifest a promise to repay the debt sufficient to reset the running of the statute of limitations.” Id. at *2.
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By: Wayne Streibich, Jonathan M. Robbin, Diana M. Eng, and Jacquelyn A. DiCicco
In Milone v. U.S. Bank National Association, New York’s Appellate Division, Second Department (“Second Department”), held that a notice of default sent to a borrower, stating that failure to cure the default within 30 days “will result in acceleration,” does not “clearly and unequivocally” accelerate the mortgage debt upon expiration of the cure period. 2018 WL 3863269, at *1, — N.Y.S.3d — (2d Dept. Aug. 15, 2018). In sum, the Second Department concluded that the word “will” indicates a future intention that “may always be changed in the interim” and, therefore, does not accelerate the debt for statute of limitations purposes. See id., at *3. In addition, the Second Department ruled that a de-acceleration notice must be clear and unambiguous, and, in a case of first impression, held that standing, when raised, is a necessary element to a valid de-acceleration. See id., at *5.
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By: Diana M. Eng, Jonathan M. Robbin, and Andrea M. Roberts
In Levi Huebner v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., Nos. 16-2363-cv, 16-2367-cv (2d Cir. July 19, 2018), the Second Circuit affirmed the Eastern District of New York’s (“Lower Court”) order granting defendant Midland Credit Management, Inc.’s (“Midland”) summary judgment motion and dismissing the complaint on the grounds that plaintiff Levi Huebner (“Plaintiff”) failed to state a claim under Sections 1692e(5), (8), and (10) of the FDCPA. The Second Circuit held Midland’s follow-up questions about the nature of Plaintiff’s dispute cannot be interpreted as threatening, or conveying false information about the consumer’s debt. Rather, Midland’s questions were an endeavor to learn more about Plaintiff’s dispute, so Midland could properly resolve the dispute. The Second Circuit also affirmed the Lower Court’s imposition of sanctions against Plaintiff and his counsel on the grounds they intentionally misled the court and Midland as to Plaintiff’s theory of the case, breached the protective order entered into amongst the parties, acted in bad faith by “unreasonably and vexatiously” multiplying the proceedings in the action, and commencing a frivolous action and filing several frivolous motions in bad faith. As such, the Lower Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Midland.
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By: Louise Bowes Marencik, Diana M. Eng, and Jonathan K. Moore
On June 21, 2018, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (“Southern District”) held that Title X of the Dodd Frank Act, which established the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) as an “independent bureau” within the Federal Reserve System, is unconstitutional.
In Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. RD Legal Funding, LLC, et al., the CFPB and The People of the State of New York, by Eric T. Schneiderman, Attorney General for the State of New York (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) alleged that the defendant entities violated the Consumer Financial Protection Act (“CFPA”) by offering cash advances to consumers awaiting payouts on settlement agreements or judgments entered in their favor, which Plaintiffs argued were actually usurious loans prohibited by state law. 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 104132 (S.D.N.Y. June 21, 2018). The consumers at issue were class members in the National Football League Concussion Litigation class action, and individuals eligible for compensation from the September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001. Continue reading
By: Edward W. Chang, Jonathan M. Robbin, Scott E. Wortman, Diana M. Eng, Hilary F. Korman
In a win for the collection industry, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals confirmed an “interest disclaimer” is only necessary on collection notices if the debt is accruing interest. While this much-needed clarification may reduce the volume of “reverse-Avila” FDCPA litigation, questions still remain about the best method to accurately characterize balances in collection notices.
In Taylor v. Fin. Recovery Servs., Inc., No. 17-1650-cv (“Taylor”), the Second Circuit confirmed that the appellants (and many other members of the consumer bar) were misapplying its decision in Avila v. Riexinger & Associates, LLC, 817 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Avila”).1 In Avila, the Second Circuit ruled that a debt collector violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) if it identifies the “current balance” of a debt without disclosing that such balance could increase due to the accrual of interest or fees. In that case, interest was actually accruing on the subject debt. Continue reading
By: Wayne Streibich, Edward W. Chang, Jonathan M. Robbin, Scott E. Wortman, Diana M. Eng, and Hilary F. Korman
In a significant ruling for businesses, technological progress, and the economy at large, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals unanimously granted in part, and denied in part, various petitions for review of the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) adoption of its 2015 Declaratory Ruling and Order (the “2015 Order”) on the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). The 2015 Order significantly changed the legal landscape of the TCPA, and had serious global consequences for numerous markets and businesses. In ACA Int’l v. FCC, (D.C. Cir. Mar. 16, 2018), the D.C. Circuit provided guidance on a number of issues, including the FCC’s “unreasonably expansive interpretation” of what constitutes an “Automatic Telephone Dialing System” or “ATDS” under the TCPA.
Congress enacted the TCPA in 1991 to curb abusive telemarketing practices and encroachments on business and consumer privacy. The TCPA contains a private right of action permitting aggrieved parties to recover $500 for each call made (or text message sent) in violation of the statute, and up to $1,500 for each “willful or knowing” violation. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). However, with the evolution of technology, statutory damages that may have seemed reasonable in 1991 have since morphed into a mammoth threat against any company employing automated dialing equipment. The FCC (the agency vested with the authority to promulgate regulations implementing the TCPA’s requirements) has further compounded the issue by propounding a litany of rulemakings and declaratory rulings that have expanded the scope and reach of the TCPA. Continue reading
By: Jonathan M. Robbin, Edward W. Chang, and Scott E. Wortman
Action Item: In a change of course from its prior holding in Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 2011), the Third Circuit rules that the terms “settlement” and “settlement offer,” in connection with collecting of a time barred debt, may connote litigation and thus mislead a consumer. However, the Court continues to hold that settlement terms alone do not necessarily constitute deceptive or misleading practices under the FDCPA.
In a unanimous published decision in Tatis v. Allied Interstate LLC, No. 16-4022 (3d Cir.) the Third Circuit reversed the District of New Jersey’s granting of a motion to dismiss. The lower court had held that a debt collector’s attempt to collect the time-barred debt did not violate the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) because the collection letter was not accompanied by a threat of legal action. In its order overruling the lower court, the Third Circuit deviated from its prior holding in Huertas v. Galaxy Asset Mgmt., 641 F.3d 28 (3d Cir. 2011) and instead looked to the more recent decisions from its sister circuits—the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh—which all held that the term “settle” could mislead a consumer. Continue reading