Second Circuit Holds No Need to Identify Components of Debt Where Collection Letter Provides Exact Amount Owed and Reaffirms Use of Safe Harbor in Holding Debt Collector’s Letter Did Not Violate the FDCPA

Jonathan M. Robbin, Diana M. Eng, and Namrata Loomba

In Kolbasyuk v. Capital Management Services, LP, No. 18-1260 (2d Cir. 2019), the Second Circuit recently held that a debt collector’s letters informing a consumer of the total present amount of debt owed satisfies Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) requirements. The Second Circuit’s decision clarified that, under the FDCPA, collection letters are not required to inform consumers of the debt’s constituent components, or the rates by which the debt may later increase.

Summary of Facts and Background

In July 27, 2017, Capital Management Services, LP (“CMS”) sent Plaintiff a collection letter stating “[a]s of the date of this letter, you owe $5918.69.” The letter further stated, “[b]ecause of interest, late charges, and other charges that may vary from day to day, the amount due on the day you pay may be greater.” Continue reading

Second Circuit Holds That Debt Collector’s Inquiry Regarding Nature of Consumer’s Verbal Dispute of Debt Did Not Violate the FDCPA

By: Diana M. Eng, Jonathan M. Robbin, and Andrea M. Roberts

In Levi Huebner v. Midland Credit Management, Inc., Nos. 16-2363-cv, 16-2367-cv (2d Cir. July 19, 2018), the Second Circuit affirmed the Eastern District of New York’s (“Lower Court”) order granting defendant Midland Credit Management, Inc.’s (“Midland”) summary judgment motion and dismissing the complaint on the grounds that plaintiff Levi Huebner (“Plaintiff”) failed to state a claim under Sections 1692e(5), (8), and (10) of the FDCPA. The Second Circuit held Midland’s follow-up questions about the nature of Plaintiff’s dispute cannot be interpreted as threatening, or conveying false information about the consumer’s debt. Rather, Midland’s questions were an endeavor to learn more about Plaintiff’s dispute, so Midland could properly resolve the dispute. The Second Circuit also affirmed the Lower Court’s imposition of sanctions against Plaintiff and his counsel on the grounds they intentionally misled the court and Midland as to Plaintiff’s theory of the case, breached the protective order entered into amongst the parties, acted in bad faith by “unreasonably and vexatiously” multiplying the proceedings in the action, and commencing a frivolous action and filing several frivolous motions in bad faith. As such, the Lower Court properly granted summary judgment in favor of Midland.

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Second Circuit Confirms Interest Disclaimer Not Required on Collection Notices Not Accruing Interest

By: Edward W. Chang, Jonathan M. Robbin, Scott E. Wortman, Diana M. Eng, and Hilary F. Korman

In a win for the collection industry, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals confirmed an “interest disclaimer” is only necessary on collection notices if the debt is accruing interest. While this much-needed clarification may reduce the volume of “reverse-Avila” FDCPA litigation, questions still remain about the best method to accurately characterize balances in collection notices.

Background

In Taylor v. Fin. Recovery Servs., Inc., No. 17-1650-cv (“Taylor”), the Second Circuit confirmed that the appellants (and many other members of the consumer bar) were misapplying its decision in Avila v. Riexinger & Associates, LLC, 817 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2016) (“Avila”).1 In Avila, the Second Circuit ruled that a debt collector violates 15 U.S.C. § 1692e of the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) if it identifies the “current balance” of a debt without disclosing that such balance could increase due to the accrual of interest or fees. In that case, interest was actually accruing on the subject debt. Continue reading

Second Circuit Holds That TCPA Does Not Permit Consumer to Unilaterally Revoke Consent for Telephone Contact Provided in Binding Contract

By: Diana M. Eng and Andrea M. Roberts

In Reyes v. Lincoln Automotive Financial Services, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently held that the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) does not permit a consumer to unilaterally revoke consent to be contacted by telephone when such consent is given as bargained-for consideration in a binding contract. Reyes v. Lincoln Automotive Fin. Servs., 2017 WL 3675363 (2d Cir. June 22, 2017).

Background

In 2012, Plaintiff-Appellant, Alberto Reyes, Jr. (“Plaintiff”), leased a car which was financed by Defendant-Appellee, Lincoln Automotive Financial Services (“Lincoln”). The lease contained a provision which expressly permitted Lincoln to contact Plaintiff. Plaintiff stopped making payments under the lease and, as a result, Lincoln called Plaintiff in an attempt to cure his default. Plaintiff disputed his balance on the lease and alleged that he requested that Lincoln cease contacting him. Despite Plaintiff’s alleged revocation of consent, Lincoln continued to call Plaintiff. As such, Plaintiff filed a complaint in the Eastern District of New York alleging violations of the TCPA.

The TCPA was enacted to protect consumers from “unrestricted telemarketing” which could be “an intrusive invasion of privacy.” See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 371 (2012) (internal citations omitted). Under the TCPA, any person within the United States is prohibited from “initiat[ing] any telephone call to any residential telephone line using an artificial or prerecorded voice to deliver a message without the prior express consent of the called party.” 47 U.S.C. 227(b)(1)(B).

Lincoln moved for summary judgment to dismiss the complaint, and the district court granted the motion, holding that (1) Plaintiff had failed to produce sufficient evidence to establish that he revoked his consent to be contacted and (2) the TCPA does not permit a party to a legally binding contract to unilaterally revoke bargained-for consent to be contacted by telephone. Plaintiff appealed both rulings.

The Second Circuit’s Decision

The Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that under the TCPA, a consumer cannot unilaterally revoke its consent to be called when such consent was part of a bargained-for exchange.[1] In assessing whether a party can revoke prior consent under the TCPA, the Second Circuit agreed with the holdings of its sister courts that a party can revoke prior voluntary or free consent under the statute. See Gager v. Dell Financial Services, 727 F.3d 265 (3d Cir. 2013) (plaintiff permitted to revoke consent, where consent was provided in an application for a line of credit); Osorio v. State Farm Bank F.S.B., 746 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. 2014) (plaintiff could revoke consent, where consent was provided in an application for auto insurance). The Second Court noted, however, that unlike in Gager and Osorio, Plaintiff’s consent was not provided gratuitously. Rather, Plaintiff’s consent was included as an express provision of a contract with Lincoln. Accordingly, the Second Circuit drew a distinction between the definition of consent under tort and contract law. Specifically, in tort law, the term “consent” is defined as a “voluntary yielding to what another purposes or desires.” Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014). However, under contract law, “consent to another’s actions can ‘become irrevocable’ when it is provided in a legally binding agreement, in which case any ‘attempted termination is not effective.’” See Restatement (Second) of Torts 892A(5) (Am. Law Inst. 1979); see also 13-67 Corbin on Contracts 67.1 (2017).

The Second Circuit also determined that a contractual term need not be “essential” to be enforced as part of a binding agreement and that contracting parties are bound to perform on the agreed upon terms; a party who agreed to a valid term in a binding contract cannot later renege on that term or unilaterally declare that it no longer applies simply because the contract could have been performed without it. “[R]eading the TCPA’s definition of ‘consent’ to permit unilateral revocation at any time, as [Plaintiff] suggests, would permit him to do just that,” and the Second Circuit could not “conclude that Congress intended to alter the common law of contracts in this way.” (citation omitted).

Conclusion

This decision is significant, as it addressed the novel issue of whether consent that is given as part of a bilateral contract may be unilaterally revoked by a consumer under the TCPA. Based on Reyes, financial institutions that have consent provisions in binding contracts with consumers have a powerful defense against TCPA claims. In practice, if a contract with a consumer contains an express consent provision, the financial institution would need to agree to the consumer’s request to revoke. Financial institutions should also be cognizant that a consumer, who provides consent to be called in an application, may unilaterally revoke such consent.

[1] The Second Circuit also held that the district court erred in finding that no reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff revoked his consent, as Plaintiff had introduced sworn testimony of revocation. However, this error does not impact the ruling that Plaintiff nevertheless cannot unilaterally revoke his consent under the TCPA when such consent is part of a binding contract.

Second Circuit Holds Payoff Letter Stating that “Total Amount Due” May Include Other Amounts that Are Not Yet Due Does Not Satisfy FDCPA Amount Due Requirement

By:      Jonathan Robbin and Thomas Brodowski

In Andrew Carlin, individually and on behalf of a class v. Davidson Fink LLP, Case No. 15-3105-cv (2d Cir. March 29, 2017),[1] the Second Circuit vacated an order and judgment of the District Court in favor of a debt collector, holding (1) that a mortgage foreclosure complaint is not an “initial communications” for purposes of § 1692g liability; and (2) that a Payoff Statement including the language “estimated fees, costs, additional payments, or escrow disbursements not yet due” does not state the “amount of the debt” as required by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. (“FDCPA”).

In June 2013, Davidson Fink filed a foreclosure complaint (the “Complaint”) against Carlin, seeking to foreclose on a 2005 mortgage given by Carlin that was allegedly in default. The Complaint included a “Notice Required by the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act,” which referred Carlin to the Complaint for the “amount of the debt” and notified Carlin that he had thirty (30) days to dispute the validity of the debt. The Complaint, however, failed to state the amount of the debt.

Thereafter, Carlin sent Davidson Fink a letter on July 12, 2013 disputing the debt and requesting a verification of the exact amount purportedly owed. In response, Davidson Fink sent Carlin a letter dated August 9, 2013 which contained, among other things, a Payoff Statement. The Payoff Statement identified a “Total Amount Due” of $205,261.79. But, in small print below the amount due, the Payoff Statement included the following disclaimer:

“To provide you with the convenience of an extended “Statement Void After” date, the Total Amount Due may include estimated fees, costs, additional payments and/or escrow disbursements that will become due prior to the “Statement Void After” date, but which are not yet due as of the date this Payoff Statement is issued.”

Notably, the Payoff Statement did not include the amounts of the estimated fees, costs, or additional payments, nor did the Payoff Statement indicate how those amounts were calculated. Consequently, Carlin sued Davidson Fink for alleged violations of the FDCPA. Davidson Fink filed a motion to dismiss, which the District Court originally denied, but then reversed its ruling following Davidson Fink’s subsequent motion for reconsideration. Carlin appealed.

Under the FDCPA, a debt collector must, within five days after an initial communication with a consumer debtor in connection with the collection of any debt, send the consumer a written notice containing the amount of the debt. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a). The FDCPA does not define an “initial communication,” but states that “[a] communication in the form of a formal pleading in a civil action shall not be treated as an initial communication for purposes of subsection (a) of this section.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(d) (added by the Financial Services Regulatory Relief Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-351, § 802(a), Stat. 1966, 2006-07 (2006)). As such, the Second Circuit also held that mortgage foreclosure complaints are not “initial communications” for purposes of § 1692g liability.

Despite the Complaint not being the initial communication, the Second Circuit held that Davidson Fink’s follow-up August 9, 2013 letter (“August Letter”) constituted the “initial communication” and was sent in connection with the collection of the debt.[2] Having determined that the August Letter was an initial communication sent to collect a debt, the Second Circuit also held that the amount of the debt stated in the August Letter was insufficient under § 1692g. Using the least sophisticated consumer standard, the Second Circuit held that because the Payoff Statement did not identify the “estimated fees, costs, [and] additional payments,” nor did it explain how those amounts are calculated, the Court was unable to determine if those amounts were properly part of the debt owed.[3] Thus, absent fuller disclosure, an unsophisticated consumer would not be able to do so either.

The Second Circuit emphasized that debt collectors like Davidson Fink can take added measures to shield themselves from FDCPA liability by revising their standard payoff statements or by including the safe harbor language formulated in the Avila v. Riexinger & Assocs., LLC[4] case.

Thus, debt collectors should ensure that Payoff Statements are clear and ambiguous as to the date in which the amount stated in the payoff will be good through and that if the funds are not received by that date, payment will increase over time.

[1] Carlin v. Davidson Fink LLP, 2017 U.S. App. Lexis 5438 (2d Cir. March 29, 2017)

[2] Plaintiff Carlin argued his July 12, 2013 letter to Davidson Fink constituted the “initial communication” but, it is well-settled that communications initiated by debtors to debt collectors are not “initial communications” under the FDCPA. See, e.g. Derisme v. Hunt Leibert Jacobson P.C., 880 F. Supp. 2d 339, 367-68 (D. Conn. 2012); Lane v. Fein, Such & Crane, LLP, 767 F. Supp. 2d 382, 387 (E.D.N.Y. 2011); Gorham-Dimaggio v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., No. 1:05-cv-0583, 2005 WL 2098068, at *2 (N.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2005).

[3] The FDCPA defines “debt” as “any obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay money arising out of a transaction…, whether or not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).

[4] 817 F.3d 72 (2d Cir. 2016) (holding though not required by the text of the statute, a notice would also satisfy § 1692g if it used language such as: “As of today, [date], you owe $  . This amount consists of a principal of $   , accrued interest of $   , and fees of $   . This balance will continue to accrue interest after [date] at a rate of $   per [date/week/month/year].”).

Second Circuit Upholds Bankruptcy Court Order Denying Borrowers’ RESPA Claim on the Grounds the QWR Was Mailed to the Incorrect Address

By: Andrea M. Roberts

In Barry F. Mack v. ResCap Borrower Claims Trust, Case Number 16-304 (2d Cir. Jan. 31, 2017) the Second Circuit recently affirmed the Bankruptcy Court’s order sustaining Residential Capital, LLC’s (“ResCap”) objection to the borrowers, Barry and Cheryl Mack’s (“Borrowers”) Proof of Claim for damages based on, among other things, failure to respond to a Qualified Written Request (“QWR”) in violation of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (“RESPA”). The Second Circuit held that Borrowers’ Proof of Claim was properly denied, because Borrowers did not mail the QWR to the designated address and therefore, ResCap’s lack of response did not violate RESPA.

In 2009 Borrowers sent a QWR to GMAC Mortgage LLC (“GMAC”) querying why an erroneous foreclosure action against them remained pending even though GMAC had notified them that they were not in default. Notably, Borrowers did not send the QWR to the address designated by GMAC for receipt of QWRs. Instead, Borrowers sent the QWR to the address designated for “General Inquiries.” GMAC never responded to Borrower’s QWR.

In May 2012, ResCap and 51 of its subsidiaries, including GMAC, filed for bankruptcy.[1] Borrowers timely filed a Proof of Claim for money damages premised upon, among other things, a violation of RESPA for GMAC’s failure to respond to the QWR. After a trial, the Bankruptcy Court sustained ResCap’s objection to the Borrower’s RESPA claim on the grounds that the Borrowers failed to mail the QWR to the correct address. Borrowers appealed.

Under RESPA, a mortgage servicer can “establish a designated address for QWRs.” See Roth v. CitiMortgage Inc., 756 F.3d 178, 181 (2d Cir. 2014). If a servicer designates a specific address for receipt of QWRs, “then the borrower must deliver its request to that office in order for the inquiry to be a ‘qualified written request.’” Id. (quoting RESPA, § 6, Transfer of Servicing of Mortgage Loans (Regulation X), 59 Fed. Reg. 65,442, 65,446 (Dec. 19, 1994)). The failure to send the QWR to a servicer’s designated address “does not trigger the servicer’s duties under RESPA.” Id. (quoting Berneike v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 708 F.3d 1141, 1148-49 (10th Cir. 2013).

The Second Circuit found that although there is no dispute that the Borrowers sent a QWR to GMAC, and GMAC failed to respond to the QWR, because Borrowers did not send the QWR to GMAC’s designated address for receipt of QWRs, the duty to respond to the Borrower’s letter under RESPA was never triggered. Therefore, GMAC did not violate RESPA. Accordingly, the Second Circuit held that the Bankruptcy Court properly sustained ResCap’s objection to the Borrowers’ RESPA claim.

In practice, borrowers or their counsel have attempted to attach purported QWRs to pleadings and then allege RESPA violations for failure to respond. This decision confirms that financial institutions cannot be liable under RESPA if the QWR is not directed to the designated address.

[1] GMAC is a named debtor under the Borrower Claims Trust Agreement dated December 17, 2013 (the “Agreement”). Under the Agreement, in pursuing any borrower-related causes of action, such matters and/or execution of any documents relating thereto, are to be in the name of “ResCap Borrower Claims Trust.”